IN AN EARLIER PAPER FOR Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, we presented findings on the relation between price inflation and consumer saving in the context of examining the role of expectational variables in consumer spending and saving decisions.' The paper focused primarily on durable goods expenditure models, and presented evidence on the usefulness of explicitly expectational variables in such models. We also looked briefly at a relatively simple saving function to see if the same expectational variables that were associated with durable goods expenditure decisions also had an impact on saving decisions. This report focuses entirely on saving, and is concerned primarily with models that can be used to predict the personal saving rate. In this report, we examine three sets of variables for their impact on the saving rate. The first is personal taxes and transfer payments, which the evidence suggests have a strong initial impact on observed saving behavior. Second, we include both the levels of and changes in the unemployment
rate; the former represents the effect of diminished actual resources, the latter the effect of uncertainty about income prospects. Third, we measure the influence of inflation, both anticipated and unanticipated, and ask whether consumer expectations and attitudes, as measured by household surveys, have any net influence on saving behavior after these other factors have been taken into account.
The predictive ability of the model developed using these explanatory variables, referred to as the forecast model, is then compared with that of a model developed by Houthakker and Taylor that is more typical of the recent literature.2 The Houthakker-Taylor model also incorporates a stock adjustment or distributed lag process, and emphasizes the influences of tax changes and the composition of personal income changes on saving behavior.
The Forecast Model
Before turning to a more detailed examination of empirical results, a summary of the variables used in the forecast model, and the reasons for their inclusion, may be useful.
TAXES AND TRANSFERS
The role of both taxes and transfers in the model is straightforward. Increases in personal income taxes reduce disposable income relative to personal income. The same is true of payroll taxes, which we combine with personal income taxes because of the absence of any strong evidence that the influence of the two is different. The question is how much of the impact of tax changes falls on saving and how much on consumption. We find, as others have before us, that changes in transfer payments have a very large and positive initial impact on saving, suggesting that people receiving transfers have a very high short-run marginal propensity to save.3 Since most transfer payments are social security benefits, which accrue to lower-income individuals with, presumably, high marginal propensities to spend, this finding presents a continuing puzzle. However, a variation of the forecast model that allows for lag effects indicates that this high propensity to save out of transfer income does not exist in the long run.
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
When the unemployment rate is high, a relatively large fraction of the population is receiving substantially less income than normal. Given the stickiness of consumption patterns, one would anticipate a reduction in the aggregate rate of personal saving as a result. Thus the direct influence of high unemployment in reducing disposable income suggests that the unemployment rate will have a negative sign in a saving equation. But changes in unemployment rates may play an entirely different role. If unemployment is rising, the fear of becoming unemployed is probably rising too. For people who continue to hold jobs and therefore suffer no actual decline in disposable income, this fear implies a retrenchment on spending and a building up of reserves via saving. When unemployment rates are declining, concern about job security will also be declining, and with it the need to build financial reserves. In the empirical work we find evidence for both a direct negative influence of the unemployment level on saving and an indirect positive influence of unemployment change on saving.
PRICE INFLATION
In our previous paper, we argue that there has been a marked difference between the effects of anticipated and unanticipated inflation.4 Traditional economic theory suggests that a fully anticipated rate of inflation has no effect on real economic behavior in the long run. For unanticipated inflation, our basic argument is that it generates an increased variance of expected real income that has asymmetrical effects on behavior; that is, a rise in the rate of price inflation above the anticipated rate tends to mean that consumers will be less certain than before about prospective changes in their real income. In decisions about whether to spend or save, the probability that real income will be improved is not accorded the same weight as the probability that real income will deteriorate. The reason is that the consequences of guessing wrong are not symmetrical: If consumers retrench on spending and it turns out that real income rises because money income rises more rapidly than prices, nothing is lost except an opportunity to consume now at favorable prices rather than later at less favorable ones. But if people act on the assumption that real income will rise and, in fact, it does not because prices outstrip money incomes, the financial consequences can be unpleasant. The argument that the increased variance in real income expectations leads to increased saving can be made for anticipated as well as unanticipated inflation if the variance of inflation expectations increases with the level. The empirical evidence associates positive saving effects only with unanticipated inflation. However, comparison of the actual and expected series reveals that periods of high inflation in the United States have never been fully anticipated.
An alternative explanation, which is consistent with the same empirical results, is that consumer expectations are biased: Because people do not generally anticipate money income increases to the same extent as they anticipate price increases, a rapid rate of inflation is taken to be synonymous with a decline in expected real income by the majority of consumers. The expected decline in real income induces increased saving as the expectations are not realized. Survey data provide some evidence that a bias toward pessimistic mean expectations about real income when prices rise relatively rapidly is not characteristic of consumers; hence the first interpretation seems more consistent with the available evidence, although unfortunately, no direct evidence exists to support it.
EXPECTATIONS AND ATTITUDES
There are several direct survey measures of consumer expectations and attitudes that are often alleged to have an influence on saving behavior. The question is whether these measures simply duplicate the information on plans and perceptions already reflected in the economic variables discussed above, or capture information that these variables fail to pick up.
Empirical Estimates
Estimates of the forecast model for the period 1954:1-1972:3 are shown in Table 1 The effect of interest rates is larger, and the effect of actual price inflation becomes smaller and in some cases disappears entirely. The interest rate coefficients seem implausibly large. When the equation is estimated for the period through 1967, the inflation effects are unchanged. Actual, as well as expected, price inflation should be correlated with long-term interest rates, and we have not been able to devise a structure that is not sensitive to the time period of estimation.
The partial effects of unemployment, U, unemployment change, AU, and interest rates, R, are all sizable: The implied unemployment elasticity of the saving rate from equation (1) is -0.6, while the interest rate elasticity is +0.28. An interest rate elasticity of this size seems implausible to us, but the standard error of the coefficient is also large. The unemployment elasticity also seems large, but the change in U is being held constant; when U is rising or falling, the net effects on saving are muted because AU has the opposite sign. The effects of transfer income and tax and social security payments, while powerful, tend to be offsetting.
In equation (2) of Table 1 , the interest rate is dropped from the basic model on the grounds that there is little a priori reason to expect any effect of interest rates on saving, net of inflation effects.5 Doing this raises the 5. The interest rate variable in equation (1) is actually a nominal rate, but the coefficient is exactly the same as if it were a real rate. It can be shown that an equation including the real rate (R -CPI) and CPI has the same R coefficient as that shown in Table 1 purchase rate, A*, is added to equation (2). The variable shows up strongly, but weakens the importance of the inflation variables. We also tried the index of consumer sentiment as an explanatory variable; it entered the equation with the appropriate negative sign, but its t-ratio was less than one. The interpretation of the coefficients on actual and expected inflation is discussed in our earlier paper.6 When both variables are in the equation, the effect of anticipated inflation is the sum of the two coefficients, and the effect of unanticipated inflation is the coefficient of CPI. The preferred equation (2) implies that anticipated inflation has only a small positive effect on saving and unanticipated inflation has a large positive effect. As noted, the data indicate that inflation is rarely fully anticipated.
In equation (4), the basic model is reestimated using a serial correlation correction based on the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation. The standard error declines by almost 15 percent, but the inflation coefficients are reduced. Their standard errors are unchanged, but their implied t-ratios fall below conventional acceptance levels.
Long-run Characteristics
The forecast model estimated here is static, yet many of the determinants of the saving rate are expected to have a lagged influence that varies over time. This is particularly true of the two income ratios, whose large estimated effects on saving shown in Table 1 are plausible as short-run phenomena only. There is no reason to think that a change in the proportion of income received as transfers should have a permanent influence on saving except through changes in the distribution of income, while a change in tax rates might be expected to change the ratio of saving to personal income, but not by as much as equation (1) suggests.
In order to test the effect of these variables on saving in the long run, the model was reestimated using eight-quarter, third-degree Almon lags on the two income ratios.7 The initial lag coefficients are of the same order of magnitude and significance as the coefficients in Table 1 When the rate of inflation is added to the behavioral equation (1), it too appears in the reduced form as a first difference. Experimentation with the inflation variables in the Houthakker-Taylor specification was not successful. Of the nonincome variables tested, only AR (and not ACPI or ACPI*) entered the equation significantly. However, the implied long-run elasticity of interest rates is so large-0.42 when evaluated at the means-that we regarded the inclusion of either inflation or interest rate variables in the long-run behavioral specification of the Houthakker-Taylor model as an unsettled issue.
We therefore tested various specifications of actual and expected inflation rates in the reduced-form Houthakker-Taylor equation. When the level of expected or actual inflation was added to the equation, AR became insignificant. The actual inflation rate was more powerful than the expected rate, and the expected purchase variable did not enter significantly. Table 2 reestimates the model with the formal specification relaxed to allow a constant term, and with inflation, but not interest rates, included as an explanatory variable. This formulation yields a modest improvement in the explanatory power of the model. The structural income coefficients are unchanged and both the constant term and the actual rate of inflation enter significantly. The actual rate of inflation has a beta coefficient of 0.12 in equation (2) A better comparison is found in Table 3 , where predicted and actual 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS

Equation (2) in
Estimates of Future Saving Rates
Future saving rates, according to our model, will depend on three things: (a) the difference between changes in personal taxes and transfers, which have tended to have offsetting effects on income secularly but reinforcing effects cyclically; (b) the path of unemployment rates; and (c) the difference between actual and expected rates of price inflation.
We assume that changes in taxes and transfers will tend to offset each other over the next year, and that unemployment rates will go down somewhat. In the model, a 0.1 percentage point drop in the level of unemployment will be just offset by a 0.33 percentage point decline in the fourquarter change in unemployment. On balance, declining unemployment will generally lead to a higher saving rate. The probable effects of inflation rates are riskier to assess. At this writing, actual inflation exceeds the ex- 
